Co-producing UK climate change adaptation policy: An analysis of the 2012

and 2017 UK Climate Change Risk Assessments by Howarth, Candice et al.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Environmental Science and Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci
Co-producing UK climate change adaptation policy: An analysis of the 2012
and 2017 UK Climate Change Risk Assessments
C. Howartha,⁎, S. Morse-Jonesa,b, K. Brooksa, A.P. Kythreotisc,d
a Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH, United Kingdom
b Collingwood Environmental Planning Ltd., 1E, The Chandlery, 50 Westminster Bridge Road, London, SE1 7QY, United Kingdom
c School of Geography, College of Science, University of Lincoln, Brayford Pool Campus, Lincoln, LN6 7TS, United Kingdom
d Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Zuckerman Institute for Connective Environmental Research, School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia,
Norwich, NR4 7TJ, United Kingdom
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Climate change risk assessment
Adaptation
Governance
Science-policy
Co-production
Communication
A B S T R A C T
This paper explores the use and perceived usefulness of the 2012 and 2017 United Kingdom Climate Change Risk
Assessment (CCRA) reports to identify potential areas of improvement for UK adaptation policy. We conducted
interviews with key stakeholders and analysed each CCRA in the context of objective, audience, budget, frame,
key ﬁndings, dissemination, and how they informed policy. We found that stakeholders used the CCRA in three
main ways: (i) to make a business case for their work; (ii) to shape direction of policy or work; and (iii) practical
applications. Our ﬁndings suggest that the way in which both CCRAs have been operationalized are symptomatic
of the UK state reinforcing scientiﬁc reductionism in adaptation assessments for policymaking.
Recommendations from interviews for future CCRAs included (i) adopting more innovative methodological
approaches, (ii) developing more eﬀective mechanisms for operationalisation of the CCRAs, and (iii) improving
communication of the CCRAs, their risks and recommendations. This would enable better alignment with user
needs and more robust inclusive decision-making processes in the assessment of future UK climate risks and
impacts. We discuss how a new framework is needed in which evidence assessments such as the CCRA can be
further developed utilising methods of co-production.
1. Introduction
As the human and physical eﬀects of climate change continually
increase, so has policy attention to climate adaptation (Massey and
Huitema, 2016; Vogel and Henstra, 2015). This has signiﬁcant spatial
planning challenges and scientiﬁc uncertainties attributed to it (Bell
et al. (2018); Vij et al., 2017) and the UK has arguably been a sig-
niﬁcant forerunner in implementing robust adaptation policy in com-
parison to other countries, given the implementation of the 2008 Cli-
mate Change Act (Benzie, 2014; Biesbroek et al., 2010; Brown et al.,
2018; Lorenz et al., 2017; Massey and Huitema, 2013). However, when
the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Aﬀairs (DEFRA)
launched its second UK Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA) in
2017, though this was the most comprehensive assessment of climate
risks in the UK to date, the launch was given relatively little publicity by
the UK Government, unlike the inaugural CCRA in 2012. This suggests
that climate change adaptation has not been given the necessary policy
attention as previously reported in the academic literature (Massey
et al., 2014; Massey and Huitema, 2013) or at least it has been hindered
by wider political forces going on in the UK most recently, like Brexit
(Rayner and Jordan, 2017).
Given the 10 year anniversary of the UK Climate Change Act, it is
timely that we take stock of progress with respect to climate adaptation
policy. Using a critical discourse analysis of the 2012 and 2017 CCRAs,
evidence on the process for compiling the CCRAs and interviews with
relevant stakeholders involved in each CCRA, we explore how CCRAs
have been undertaken. The process in which CCRAs have been com-
piled and the way climate information/knowledge has been utilised is
particularly signiﬁcant given the emergence of a literature grounded
across the social sciences and cognate disciplines that questions the
types of knowledge used in formulating climate policy, the most sig-
niﬁcant being the prevalent use of more globally reductive forms of
scientiﬁc knowledge to determine future climate projections (Demeritt,
2001; Hulme, 2011, 2010). It has been argued such epistemic knowl-
edge use has prevented more reﬂexive, communicative local knowledge
that is co-produced through relevant governance systems being used
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more to determine the types of climate policies needed to mitigate
climate impacts and reduce human vulnerabilities across diﬀerent
spatial jurisdictions as dangerous climate change ensues (Beck, 2011;
Hinkel, 2011; Howarth and Painter, 2016; Jasanoﬀ, 2010; Kythreotis,
2018; Kythreotis et al., 2013). Hence, our comparative analysis of the
2012 and 2017 CCRAs speciﬁcally examines the forms of knowledge,
process and types of users used in each assessment to critically de-
marcate the signiﬁcant role of co-production in producing more eﬀec-
tive evidence-based adaptation policy in the UK. This is important given
the ambiguous role of the UK central government’s relationship with
forms of polycentric governance within recent UK adaptation policy
formulation (Gillard et al., 2017).
Section two brieﬂy summarises the background to adaptation policy
in the UK since the 2008 Climate Change Act came into force. Section
three compares the 2012 and 2017 CCRAs in terms of objective, audi-
ence, budget, frame, key ﬁndings, dissemination, and how they have
informed (adaptation) policy. Section four examines the use, usefulness
and potential for improvements in the CCRAs going forward. In asses-
sing the CCRAs, this paper adds new policy insights into how future
adaptation frameworks like the CCRA can be improved further in terms
of co-production and greater user inclusivity. This in turn will catalyse
more eﬀective, evidence-based adaptation policy and practice in the
UK.
2. Brief background to UK adaptation policy
The following section brieﬂy discusses how UK adaptation policy
has evolved since 2008. For a more comprehensive background for
adaptation as a policy ﬁeld, see Massey and Huitema (2013); Massey
et al.(2014) or Lorenz et al. (2017). Driven by the Stern Review on the
Economics of Climate Change (2006), the UK was one of the ﬁrst
countries to introduce “a risk-based approach into climate change leg-
islation” to address unavoidable climate change impacts (Brisley et al.,
2012: 5). Over the last decade, UK climate policy has principally
evolved out of the legally binding Climate Change Act of 2008, which
set speciﬁc strategies on climate mitigation and adaptation. The Act set
out a procedure to conduct a Climate Change Risk Assessment (CCRA)
every ﬁve years, which would highlight associated risks and opportu-
nities from future climate change (Committee on Climate Change,
2008). The ﬁrst CCRA was published in 2012. Other related initiatives
emerging out of the Act included a new independent advisory body, the
UK Committee on Climate Change (UKCCC) who would, inter alia, re-
view CCRA processes and procedures. The Act also gave the UK Gov-
ernment an Adaptation Reporting Power (ARP) to direct other organi-
sations, ‘Reporting Authorities’ to prepare reports on the current and
future risks and opportunities from climate impacts on that organisa-
tion; and their proposals for adapting to a changing climate (DEFRA,
2012). The evidence-base of climate risks and opportunities reported
from the ﬁrst CCRA in 2012 led to the statutory implementation of the
UK National Adaptation Programme (NAP) in 2013. NAPs also enabled
Local Authorities (LAs) to start to build local capacity with non-state
stakeholders in planning for climate change. However, this was done on
a voluntary basis, conﬁrming previous critiques of NAPs for their lack
of co-ordination, stakeholder involvement and having unclear divisions
of responsibilities (Biesbroek et al., 2010).
Nevertheless, in 2010 DEFRA also established the Local Adaptation
Advisory Panel (LAAP) to enhance capacity on local adaptation by
providing a policy link between central and local governments (DEFRA,
2011). With the Environment Agency, in 2011, DEFRA also part-funded
Climate UK, a network of state and non-state organisations supporting
climate action across the UK, suggesting that central government was
relinquishing a degree of control over local adaptation planning and
practice, whilst maintaining ﬁnancial control over the UK local adap-
tation policy agenda. Yet a transition from more centrally orchestrated
adaptation governing to local co-production (non-state and state) gov-
ernance was short-lived, due to the abolition of some major adaptation
programmes that supported local adaptation planning and practice (e.g.
Climate Ready and Climate UK ended in March 2016 due to central
government ﬁnancial constraints, Committee on Climate Change,
2017a p.18; Salvidge, 2016). The LAAP functions also changed from
supporting local adaptation action to informing policy to feed into the
NAP (Committee on Climate Change, 2017b). These represent sig-
niﬁcant changes in the relationship between national adaptation policy
agenda setting and the practice of local adaptation planning and gov-
ernance. With local adaptation planning and governance suﬀering from
such budget cuts, evidence of best practice, risks and opportunities
remained communicated mainly through the national CCRAs in the UK.
As such, we feel it pertinent to undertake a comparative assessment of
the UK 2012 and the 2017 CCRAs with respect to objective, audience,
methodology, budget, frame, key ﬁndings, dissemination, and how they
informed policy, as a means to highlight the ever-changing landscape of
adaptation policy and practice in the UK today.
3. Comparing the 2012 and 2017 Climate Change Risk
Assessments
The UK CCRA sets out the main priorities for climate change
adaptation in the UK and the NAP with a vision of “A society which
makes timely, far sighted and well-informed decisions to address the
risks and opportunities posed by a changing climate” (DEFRA, 2013:
11), and outlines thematic policies and actions to meet these ends. The
2017 CCRA acknowledged key limitations in the 2012 CCRA which
subsequently informed the methodology and development of the
former, notably that it ‘assessed the potential impacts of climate change
without taking account of current adaptation plans and activity’, that
magnitude and conﬁdence scores were used to summarise results and
that UK impacts of domestic and international risks of climate change
were not included (Humphrey and Murphy, 2016: 8). The 2017 CCRA
Synthesis Report summarises some of the diﬀerences compared to the
previous CCRA as do each of the chapters in the 2017 CCRA Evidence
Report. The approach adopted, content and structure of the 2012 and
2017 Climate Change Risk Assessments is outlined in their components
that feature in the body of their reports, methods adopted, the review
process and outputs produced (Table 1).
Due to methodological changes, the 2012 and the 2017 UK CCRAs
are not comparable as such. As explained by the Adaptation Sub
Committee’s (ASC) 2014 Method Document for the UK CCRA Evidence
Report 2016, this has primarily been caused by a signiﬁcant budget cut
from the £3 million allocated for the ﬁrst CCRA to under £1 million for
the second (ASC, 2014). As a result, the UK CCRA 2016 Evidence Re-
view is “underpinned by a large body of peer-reviewed scientiﬁc lit-
erature and grey literature” and acknowledges the associated diﬃcul-
ties, namely evidence gaps associated with uncertainties. With the
ﬁnancial support of the UK Natural Environment Research Council
(NERC), the ASC commissioned four research projects to contribute to
an assessment of the evidence and “help in translating existing research
into a usable format” (ASC, 2014: 3) to inform the second UK CCRA.
These projects focused on projections of ﬂood risk in the UK (Sayers
et al., 2015), water availability in the UK (HR Wallingford et al., 2015),
impact of climate change on UK’s natural assets (AECOM, 2015), and
developing climate change scenarios (Wade et al., 2015). As a result,
the evidence-base commissioned by the ASC, and which underpinned
the 2017 CCRA, relied on diﬀerent, un-standardised assumptions about
baseline data, the degree of climate change and impacts, socio-eco-
nomic responses and adaptation processes. To address this issue, the
ASC developed a new methodological (primarily qualitative) approach
focusing on a literature review, in addition to results from the four
research projects and expert judgement mainly used “to assign con-
ﬁdence and urgency scores [to the evidence as well as the risks], and
also to characterise future adaptation eﬀorts in many cases” (ASC,
2014: 5).
The methodological change adopted would also address data, policy
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and audience needs, particularly to allow readers to understand ad-
vances in the evidence since the ﬁrst UK CCRA (ASC, 2014: 4), to reﬂect
“on the extent to which the risks have changed as a result of actions
taken under the [NAP] and beyond” (DEFRA, 2013: 13). The aim of the
UK CCRA Evidence Report 2016 was to address a single, policy-relevant
question about the urgency of further action: “Based on the latest un-
derstanding of current, and future, climate risks/opportunities, vul-
nerability and adaptation, what should the priorities be for the next UK
National Adaptation Programme and adaptation programmes of the
devolved administrations” (Committee on Climate Change, 2017b). In
comparison, the aim of UK CCRA 2012 “to undertake an assessment of
the main risks (both threats and opportunities) posed by climate change
that will have social, environmental or economic consequences for the
UK” (Baglee et al., 2012: 3) is broader and less speciﬁc. In this en-
deavour, the UK CCRA Evidence Report 2016 targeted a smaller
number of risks and opportunities (approximately 60 risks and oppor-
tunities are assessed by UK CCRA 2017, as opposed to over 100 in UK
CCRA 2012). It presents results primarily in terms of the urgency of
further action in the short-term as well as “the magnitude of risks and
potential impacts in the long-term”(Committee on Climate Change,
2016, p. 48). These methodological changes may be linked to budget
constraints but greater speciﬁcity and a robust alternative approach
may also facilitate clearer communication of the evidence so that it is
credible, robust, and relevant, and can be used more widely to inform
adaptation decisions made by Government and other stakeholders
(ASC, 2014: 5). A number of climate risks to the UK were assessed by
leading academics and other experts as part of the Evidence Report
2016 ranging from ﬂooding and heatwaves to water scarcity and ocean
acidiﬁcation. In assessing the magnitude of risks and the urgency of
additional action the following are taken into account: risks to the UK
from climate change overseas; cross-cutting risks relating to the capa-
city of communities, businesses, infrastructure providers and national
and local government across the UK to act early and eﬀectively;
changing vulnerability to climate change impacts; and steps already
underway, or expected to be, across the UK to adapt.
As previously discussed, the implications of using qualitative and/or
judgement-based data could include the ﬁndings being subject to ac-
cusations of subjectivity and inaccuracy due to the inherent diﬀerences
in assumptions and measurement and methodological frameworks uti-
lised by secondary sources and their authors. However, the threefold
approach employed by the ASC: a literature review combined with four
research projects and the use of expert knowledge and understanding
should have helped to ensure that the Evidence Report 2016 drew on a
comprehensive, relevant and balanced evidence base.
Given the gap between the amount of evidence available and end
user needs, we have discussed the ability of the 2012 and 2017 CCRAs
to actually determine the state and direction of adaptation policy in the
UK. The 2012 CCRA was initiated by the UK Government at the time as
a means “to embrace long-term planning and better understand risks,
backed up by the best evidence, including horizon-scanning and sci-
ence” (Government, 2012: 5). Yet there is increasing academic evidence
that using scientiﬁc evidence on climate change to inform adaptation
Table 1
Comparison of methodological approach for CCRA 2012 and CCRA 2017 (Adapted from Humphrey and Murphy, 2016).
Aspect of report CCRA 2012 CCRA 2017
Risks and opportunities > 100, from a list of 700 ∼60, selected by government and report authors
Metrics for summarising results Focus on magnitude Focus on urgency
Time periods covered 2020s
2050s
2080s
Current
2020s
2050s
2080s
Post 2100 (for sea level rise)
Analysis type Mix of existing data and new
analysis to create ‘response
functions’ for risks and
opportunities
Mostly synthesis of existing analysis with some new data from four
specially-commissioned research projects
Climate science use UK Climate Projections
UKCP09
To explore diﬀerent climate scenarios
UKCP09
Global CMIP5 model ensemble
Single-models
Other scenario-based approaches
Consideration of drivers of risk Excluded eﬀects of planned adaptation of socio-economic change
beyond population growth
Included analysis of eﬀects of adaptation and socio-eco change on risk/
opportunity where evidence exists
Spatial coverage England
Northern Ireland
Scotland
Wales
England
Northern Ireland
Scotland
Wales
International dimension
Outputs 11 sector reports
1 synthesis report
3 national summaries
1 synthesis report
1 evidence report
4 national summaries
4 research reports
Authors Consultants (HR Wallingford)
Signed oﬀ by DEFRA
Independent academics
Consultants (led by ASC)
Signed oﬀ by ASC
Cost £3 million over three years £650 K over three years
Funders DEFRA
Devolved administrations
DEFRA
Devolved administrations
Natural Environment Research Council
Environment Agency
Peer review process DEFRA-led stakeholder review
process
Method: Adaptation Sub-Committee
Sector reports and evidence report: independent peer review
Method and outputs: DEFRA Science Advisory Council
DEFRA-led stakeholder review process
ASC-organised workshops
and conferences on method and
outputs
Chapters and synthesis report: independent peer review and
external review by organisations
Method: DEFRA Science Advisory Council and Economic Advisory Panel.
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policy can be epistemologically problematic (Dessai et al., 2009;
Howarth et al., 2016; Preston et al., 2015), and this is even before
thinking about the institutions and types of governance that are needed
to implement such epistemic scientiﬁc knowledge informed adaptation
policy across diﬀerent spatial jurisdictions (Beck, 2011; Huitema et al.,
2016; Kythreotis et al., 2013; Kythreotis and Bristow, 2017). There is a
body of work that cites the beneﬁts of using other social, political,
cultural and even historical narratives beyond more deterministic
global epistemic expertise to inform adaptation practice at other spatial
scales, particularly the local (Adamson et al., 2018; Adger et al., 2013;
Hulme, 2011, 2010; Jasanoﬀ, 2010; Kythreotis, 2018; McEvoy et al.,
2013; Paschen and Ison, 2014).
With respect to the UK CCRAs, Brown et al. (2018) argue how the
second CCRA has used a science-led approach to its work. This in itself,
whilst intended to be more robust with respect to using a wider evi-
dence-base to inform policy decisions, was still based upon the mag-
nitude of climate impacts under low, medium and high projections
using the 2009 UK Climate Projections. Such projections epitomize the
way in which reductive science has determined policy responses to
mitigation through Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
reports which foreclose other alternative social and cultural epis-
temologies and reinforced a techno-managerial science-policy process
(O’Lear, 2016). The process of CCRA formulation with respect to
adaptation policy is also unfolding through a reductive risk-based fra-
mework based on scenario model building, cost-beneﬁt analyses and
urgency scores vis-à-vis more socio-culturally equitable co-production
methods that place citizens aﬀected by climate impacts at the centre of
adaptation decision-making. This reductive risk framework approach
has proved highly problematic for governments to implement eﬀective
adaptation policy measures given the complexity of interrelating socio-
political and cultural factors coupled with temporal uncertainty in how
physical climate impacts are manifested (Adger et al., 2018). It also
perpetuates historical and existing institutional policy structures for
climate adaptation that forecloses alternative iterations in policy
pathways of adaptation response (Adamson et al., 2018). Conversely,
other work has cautioned against overusing social and cultural local
knowledge, arguing for greater hybridity between diﬀerent forms of
knowledge – scientiﬁc and lay – to determine appropriate adaptation
responses to ﬂooding (e.g. Haughton et al., 2015; Lane et al., 2011). In
light of these complex science-policy arguments, we next examine the
use, usefulness and potential for improvements in respective 2012 and
2017 CCRAs to reconcile some of the major disparities between using
the correct and best available evidence to meet end-user needs and
requirements for future adaptation policy and practice in the UK.
4. The UK 2012 and 2017 CCRAs: use, usefulness and potential for
improvements
4.1. Methodology
To examine use, usefulness and potential for improvements in the
CCRAs, data was collected from 27 UK stakeholders through semi-
structured interviews, a format which follows a general set of questions
aimed at enabling interviewees to be free to respond as they please with
limited restriction by the questions set. Key stakeholders were sampled
from three pre-deﬁned categories (see Howarth and Monasterolo,
2016): Policy communities (involved in formulating policies and deci-
sions on climate change), Practitioners (involved in implementation of
climate-related solutions or decision making processes on the ground),
and Academia/Science. The geographic coverage of interviewees was
UK-wide however the majority of these were located in London and the
South/South-East of England. Eﬀorts were made to secure an even re-
presentation across the three categories and recognising the breadth of
work that can contribute to delivering resilience in respect to managing
and responding to climate risks, to include individuals that are directly
or indirectly, involved in decision-making processes. Individuals were
approached based on their knowledge, expertise and experience of
decision-making in relation to climate change, impacts and adaptation.
This was determined based on an assessment of the literature, review of
UK organisations and institutions, attendance lists to high proﬁle cli-
mate adaptation-related events and network contacts. In addition, a
snowball technique was employed by asking interviewees for their re-
commendations of others with relevant insights to contribute to the
research.
A total of 27 interviews were carried out, with an even split across
policy (n=9), practitioners (n=9) and academic/science (n=9)
communities; female interviewees accounted for 30% of the total
(n= 8) whilst male interviewees accounted for 70% (n=19).
Organisations represented by interviewees included: universities and
academic institutions, government departments and agencies, govern-
ment funded independent bodies and organisations, local government,
a water utility company, an infrastructure consultancy, local resilience
forums, ﬂood forums, partnerships, an insurance company, and a
transport organisation. Interviewees had a range of backgrounds and
experiences including: climate and weather science and forecasting,
social science, communication, ﬂood and coastal risk management,
resilience, community engagement and community projects, policy,
research and development, insurance and risks. The interview adopted
a semi-structured format to maximise openness and ﬂow of discussion
and explored the following themes:
1) How the CCRA is used or seen as useful in decision-making;
2) Reﬂections on the 2012 and 2017 CCRAs
3) Areas for improvement
Interviews were treated as anonymous and conﬁdential, within the
bounds agreed. Interviews were conducted in May 2017 with the ma-
jority conducted over telephone or Skype. Interviews were audio-re-
corded (following consent of interviewees) using a digital Dictaphone
and transcribed. A quality assurance process was applied whereby each
interview transcript was reviewed by the interviewer and then sent to
the interviewee for accuracy and veriﬁcation. Interview transcripts
were coded using a combination of inductive and deductive coding.
Three randomly selected transcripts (one from each category) were
analysed to reﬁne a draft set of emergent themes and sub-themes for
coding and analysis. A parallel assessment was conducted to test the
robustness and validity of the emerging coding strategies. Following
reﬂection and reﬁnement, the main themes and sub-themes were
agreed. Interviewees were assigned individual identiﬁer codes to
guarantee their anonymity, these were speciﬁc to the pre-deﬁned ca-
tegory they were assigned to: Policy (PO1, PO2 etc.), Practitioner
(PRA1, PRA2, etc.) and Academic (ACA1, ACA2, etc.).
4.2. Use and usefulness of the CCRAs
Just under half of the interviewees had contributed to the CCRA in
some way whether it be leading the writing of the report (PO4), in-
putting into the science (AC1), feeding into the evidence (PR7), con-
tributing to the energy sector report, communication and summary
documents (AC2), to the international chapter (AC5), and to the
Evidence Report that underpins the 2017 report (PO7), and providing a
response (PO3). The CCRA is used by the majority of the interviewees in
three key ways. Firstly, it is used to demonstrate a business case for
adaptation as the CCRA is seen as authoritative by diverse audiences, it
can be a powerful tool to highlight the importance and need to prior-
itise work. It has been used in communications with a variety of au-
diences, to establish the need for action, for example its contents and
key ﬁndings were used in a letter to the UK Secretary of State (PR4) and
in wider communication with the public to attempt to reduce apathy to
ﬂood risk and climate change. It has been helpful to contextualise work
on climate, enabling focus on points of intersect or interest with others
sectors to deliver win-win situations (PO7). More speciﬁcally, it
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provides context to a number of sectoral recommendations for re-
sponses and adaptation, demonstrating a business case internally, as it
clearly identiﬁes a need for this work (PO3).
“We use it very much as part of our informing the public to try and cut
through the general apathy that there is within the public of actually the
ﬂood risk that they’re at and the impact of climate change. (…) we often
quote the work of the committee, for example, in a recent letter to the
Secretary of State around surface water subsystems for new develop-
ments we quoted the report.” (PR4)
“The value in it for me is the fact that it’s a kind of externally validated
statement of where climate risks are at for the UK. So it has that kind of
authority. So it’s very useful for example in certain reports to say, this is
the opinion of a group of experts that’s been peer reviewed.” (PR3).
Secondly, the CCRA is used to help shape policy or work; it iden-
tiﬁes key priority areas that need addressing and provides a focus and a
focal point to those particular issues (PO9) such as food security (PR7).
The CCRA helps to set a direction for work providing a formal statement
of risk, this is especially important for government bodies so that their
work is aligned with what national government accepts and recognises.
The application of this is particularly relevant in the risks identiﬁed in
CCRA which are used to set direction for the National Adaption
Programme (PO7) and indirectly through government highlighting a
need for more research in a particular area e.g. heatwaves (AC7).
“We do use it in the sense that when we see where the risks identiﬁed,
that does inform what we might want to invest more in, researching the
climate of. So for example, if it’s ﬂooding has come out as a very high
risk then it’s very clear that there is a requirement for us to be better at
modelling extreme rainfall events…..One of the reasons I’m doing so
much work on food security is because the climate change risk assessment
has picked up the fact that we don’t really know how much the UK will be
exposed to ﬂuctuating food prices as a fault of climate change. (…) So I
don’t know if that means using it, but it does change our perspective of
how serious or how signiﬁcant changes in climate are.” (PR7)
“It sort of underpins our policy, it’s one of the things that helps drive
forward how we do things.” (PO3)
Thirdly, the CCRA is used in designing practical application of cli-
mate responses. It has been used to understand the impacts of climate
change which could increase or exacerbate the vulnerability of a system
or infrastructure, for example. Its ﬁndings have been built into tools,
models and frameworks to inform decision-making to build resilience to
climate impacts, ensuring a greater degree of precision and scrutiny. It
has been used in the design of permanent hard engineering structures
particularly in cities (AC4), in the mapping of UK risk assessment in
London (AC8), and as a resource and summary of the evidence base
(PO7). It becomes embedded in decision-making processes and sup-
plements advice given to drive, design and implement solutions and
responses to climate impacts.
“Use it at a very high empirical level (…), it helps us to understand where
the impacts are for… when we’re building our ﬂood defences so we build
that sort of detail into our model” (PO1)
“It’s embedded within lots of our work so it’s embedded in the advice we
give to local planning authorities on how to make decisions over spatial
planning and development in the ﬂoodplain so they have to look at cli-
mate change.” (PO6)
The CCRA is viewed as a useful piece of work which provides a more
simpliﬁed perspective of a complex issue which, traditionally, is sci-
entiﬁcally heavy, and informs broader decision-making on climate
adaptation in the UK.
“I really like it, I think the approach is very useful, it’s very pragmatic
and it simpliﬁes what can become a very complex and sort of scientiﬁc
data-driven process.” (AC5)
“The UK climate impact assessment has a particular purpose to it which
is to inform our national adaptation strategy.” (PO2)
It provides clear insights into a wide range of datasets, portrayed in
a number of ways to depict the complexity of the data in a more sim-
pliﬁed way. In addition it highlights very clearly the key risks the UK is
exposed to which is particularly praised by practitioner interviewees
“It’s very good. They have some really good data (…).They bring to-
gether narratives and then evidence base, and sometimes commission
stuﬀ, and they’ll have a view. I don’t always agree with the view, but
they’ll have a view on something, and that’s quite useful. So, they have
charts that’s useful and things like that.” (PR1)
“One of the things that the CCRA did quite well I thought was to highlight
the priority risks and the key risks. Again, that’s quite useful to be able to
point to that and say, you know, as the CCRA point out, ﬂooding is the
number one risk in the UK. So it’s that kind of thing rather than detail
which I think it’s really useful for.” (PR3)
Whilst the CCRA is used to inform decision-making and responses to
climate change by a range of participants, some stated that they do not
use it. It has been recognised and seen as authoritative in delivering up
to date and robust evidence on climate risks to the UK, however it is not
always seen as relevant to some organisation’s speciﬁc business func-
tions, it has a UK-speciﬁc focus and has speciﬁc timescales, and uses
diﬀerent mechanisms for conducting research.
“It doesn’t aﬀect what we do necessarily, we’re aware of it, in eﬀect, you
know, we put our eﬀorts into making sure we map and model the world
as it is today” (PR5)
“…our focus is on overseas, so there’s no reason why we would. I know
the UK assessment does have an international bit but there were many
sources of that data so it all wouldn’t necessarily look to that.” (PO2)
“Not directly, to be honest. We mostly look at forecasting and warning
timescales, so in our terminology, that’s about up to two weeks in ad-
vance of an event, so where most of our work and our products are being
focused on.” (AC7)
“We don’t use it directly but we do use something else the government
produces, the National Risk Assessment which is slightly diﬀerent. It
takes a shorter outlook, a ﬁve year outlook. (…) Climate change risks
are typically fairly far away and our risks are much closer and we are
trying to bridge the gap there.” (PR6)
A number of minor issues have also been raised in regards to the
appropriateness of some methodologies used by the latest CCRA. For
example, the 2017 CCRA Evidence Report identiﬁed bias in some of the
observed ﬂooding data which PO4 asserts can potentially overestimate
risk. In addition, challenges also exist in ensuring vulnerability is ap-
propriately incorporated into economic Cost Beneﬁt Analysis appraisals
to inform ﬂood risk management decision-making, as it is considered
diﬃcult to know whether approaches assessed are adequately addres-
sing this in order to avoid creating further inequality (PO6). The use of
external research methods has also been raised as potentially in-
appropriate as evidence produced may not be robust enough to inﬂu-
ence government decision-making in the intended way e.g. due to over
claiming or an aspect of method not being fully adequate (PO9).
In addition, interviewees raised questions around issues of quality
and value for money of producing the CCRA. This is particularly the
case when diﬀerent parts of the CCRA (as described above) were de-
livered by diﬀerent organisations meaning the writing and underlying
evidence base are not fully consistent. Similarly the extent to which it is
used varied depending on the motivation for using its ﬁndings and
implementing these within the diﬀerent timescales required by stake-
holders contrasted with those outlined in the report.
“I had a look at the latest one. I know some of the people who were
involved in diﬀerent bits of it and the quality varies substantially prob-
ably because the underlying science is of varying quality.” (AC3)
“There is a slight sense in which I’m not sure that was particularly good
value for money. Why do we spend all that money doing it? I’m more
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familiar with what happened with the ﬁrst one, 2012 one, we did a risk
assessment because this is what you do but it is really clear that actually
what substantive decisions rest on it? Not least of which because of the
time scale for that is diﬀerent than for … most emergency planning
operates on a ﬁve year time frame.” (AC3)
“It is hard to say whether that is useful because it like we are working on
25 year horizons, we never actually got there yet to demonstration
whether we were right or not.” (PR10)
4.3. Comparing and improving the two versions: 2012 vs 2017
A comparison of the two versions of the UK CCRA (Table 2) was
expressed as a necessary endeavour to explore the progress made in the
ﬁve-year window between the ﬁrst and second (AC8), the trends that
may emerge, what has been addressed, and what has not worked well
(PO9). For example, progress can be seen to be made with Property
Level Resilience (PLR), as more is known now and it has become more
of a mainstream activity than it was before (PO3). Methodological
diﬀerences were noted between the two versions (AC2; AC5; PO2; PO4;
PR3) yet views ranged on the relative merits of the two versions, though
the two were seen as complementary (AC2). The ﬁrst version beneﬁtted
from its clear structure and the production of a lot of new research
under a well-deﬁned methodology, involving formal engagement with
end-users e.g. energy and transport sectors, and a formal process of risk
prioritisation (AC2). It was also very technically driven, including ex-
tensive work on climate scenarios, modelling impacts, and considera-
tion of a wide range of hazards (AC5); it was more focused on the
magnitude of diﬀerent risks, but was found to be lacking in terms of
clarity on its recommendations for government policy (PO4). The
second version beneﬁted from using a more academic approach
drawing on existing literature and enabling a wider set of evidence to
be brought in rather than being constrained by a closed method (AC2).
It is considered to be stronger on technical methods and presentation of
information such as uncertainties (PO2), and it is considered more user-
friendly and less technical with a more straightforward, intuitive ap-
proach and, using an expert-drive qualitative assessment, making it
cheaper and easier for non-experts to understand (AC5). Overall it is
seen as having a greater focus on the urgency of actions to address the
risks outlined, although magnitude or the assumptions made are not
necessarily consistent across all risks, yet outcomes in term of urgency
are consistent (PO4). In addition a key aspect is that it appears to be
better designed to provide more direction for policy (PO4) leading to
some interviewees taking the view that the latest report is the best to
use (e.g. PR3, AC4). Building on this, interviewees suggested three
important areas in which the Climate Change Risk Assessments could be
improved: methodology, operationalisation and communication (sum-
marised in Table 3).
4.3.1. Methodological improvements
The evolving nature of science, means there is a need for continual
updates/improvements, and therefore, to some extent, the CCRA 2017
is already out of date (PO7). In terms of methodology, there are a
number of technical improvements that can be made (PO2) such as
improving the approach for estimating the number of properties at risk
going forward which would not be protected through strategic schemes
(an issue which is being reviewed (PO3)). In addition, building on
methodological developments to improve the underpinning approaches
used to develop the assessments with the use of new bespoke research,
going beyond the production of the assessment through external con-
sultancy, at very early stages (AC2). Whilst this would provide a more
innovative approach to building on the existing CCRAs and in-
corporating more up to date techniques and methods for modelling
data, building scenarios and plotting risks, this is subject to funding and
resource available (AC2).
“There’s a third way of doing it which we haven’t done yet, which is a
new bespoke research speciﬁcally focusing on the CCRA question, the
climate change risk assessment question in a wider way than just in a
consultancy way, I think the consultancy method applied existing tech-
niques; what we haven’t done is developed new techniques and new
understanding to underpin the next risk assessment, (…). It’s the usual
thing you need to convince the powers that be that this is the right thing to
do. I think the government would like to see that but of course it’s who
Table 2
Interview respondent’s comparisons of 2012 and 2017 CCRAs.
2012 CCRA 2017 CCRA
Methodology • Production of substantial new research• Well-deﬁned methodology •
More academic & considered stronger on technical methods
• Draws on existing literature• Considers wider evidence-base
Stakeholder engagement • Extensive involving formal engagement with end-users • Considered more user-friendly and less technical• Easier for non-experts to understand
Content • Clear structure• Very technically driven• More focused on magnitude of diﬀerent risks
• Good presentation of information (e.g. uncertainties)• Greater focus on urgency of actions to address risks• Magnitude or assumptions on risks not always consistent• Consistent outcomes on urgency
Recommendations • Lacks clarity on policy recommendations • Better designed to provide more direction for policy
Table 3
Recommendations on how to improve future CCRAs.
Methodological improvements • Improve approach to estimate number of properties at risk• Improve underpinning approaches used to develop the assessments: use new bespoke research, going beyond the production of the assessment
through external consultancy, at very early stages
• Adopt innovative approach to building on existing CCRAs and incorporating more up to date techniques and methods for modelling data,
building scenarios and plotting risks
Operationalisation • Focus on the local and city levels to help guide decision-makers on climate resilience and solutions• Provide more clarity on responsibility(ies) for response• Identify impacts at operational level• Provide more speciﬁc, sector and stakeholder-focused recommendations• Identify and build on interlinkages to better align with decision-making processes
Better communication • Clearly demonstrate why it is useful and to whom, especially to those outside of government• Provide clearer explanation of diﬀerence between long-term climate change and climate variability• Address language barriers to make reports less academics and more accessible
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pays for it isn’t it, and kind of will the research councils pay for it or
members pay for it? So things are under way to try and make something
like this happen but it’s still at very, very early stages.” (AC2)
4.3.2. More operational
A recurring theme in the interviews was the need to make the CCRA
more operational, particularly with a focus on the local level to help
guide decision-makers on climate resilience and solutions. For example,
more interlinkages are required as currently the report is still felt to be
too decoupled from decision-making processes, which presumes that
the science production comes ﬁrst followed by decision making pro-
cesses (AC3). In a number of places, it covers a range of responsibility
areas with less clarity on responsibility for response, making it hard to
then inﬂuence change. It would therefore beneﬁt from more speciﬁc
recommendations as currently the recommendations made are per-
ceived as too big and broad making it diﬃcult to pinpoint what is re-
quired (PO9).
More precisely, additional information is needed on the impacts of
climate risks at an operational level, for example, on vegetation and
waste treatment and speciﬁcally how to plan for these where more
granular understanding of the impact of heatwaves on people and in-
frastructure could add value. The report needs to be made ﬁt for pur-
pose to direct and support actions to build resilience and to advise how
to adapt and prepare for such risks in order to reduce any downstream
impacts. This is particularly relevant when considering the onset of
some of the risks outlined in the report, for example, to ensure that
power supplies and drinking water are available during ﬂooding events
(AC4). It was also found to inadequately address (particularly in
Chapter 7) the risks to UK cities such as London where the UK's key
ﬁnancial investments are likely to be at risk of climate destabilisation.
This is further exacerbated when residents in the areas lack awareness
of these risk. It was seen as disappointing that the CCRA did not directly
address this (AC8).
"I think that is thinking it through to the next level of iteration or op-
eration (…).. We now routinely think about what it is going to mean
maybe for meteorology and hydrometeorology but it is almost then
thinking through if we do have that massive heat wave or drought or we
have that massive ﬂood, how does that then impact on kind of people,
services, infrastructure, so we could do a bit more planning about
that….We know some of these things are coming and we should think
about our practices to maybe involve them slightly so they are more ﬁt for
purpose to help people become a bit more resilient rather than just as-
suming it down to the people that take action. Be that thinking about how
we issue warnings or manage beds for heat waves…” (AC4)
Conversely, the point was also made that while local level in-
formation is critical to inform adaptation decisions, the remit of the
CCRA is to provide a summary of the evidence of risks at the national
scale. Therefore it is not solely the responsibility of the CCRA to im-
prove, rather to explore how subsequent documents, such as the
National Adaptation plan, and the work around economics and resi-
lience can be built upon to incorporate these issues (PR3). In addition,
shorter term considerations within CCRA are important and could in-
deed be helpful in helping to plan resilience to climate change in future,
this may not in fact be fully ﬁt the purpose of the document (PR6).
4.3.3. Better communication
There was some consensus that the CCRA needs to be better com-
municated in order to explain why it is useful and to extend its reach,
especially to those outside of government (PO2). It needs to provide
clearer explanations of the diﬀerences between long-term climate
change and climate variability in order to avoid misunderstandings
regarding expectations for short-term weather (AC2). The summaries
provided and the top six priorities were felt, by some, to omit important
information contained deeper in the report (AC8) although the ﬁnal
report was seen as too cumbersome at 200 pages (PO9) and too aca-
demic in nature, making it too technical for public consumption, which
calls for simpler messaging (PR4).
“Better communication of it although I should think, well probably less
than 0.1% of the population of the UK has ever even heard of it. So better
communicating it, explaining why it’s useful. I think it’s used in gov-
ernment a lot but outside of government.” (PO2)
“… it’s actually in the parliamentary records that when there was a very
severely cold winter a few years ago and Heathrow was closed for ex-
ample, it actually, they did say they thought there wouldn’t be any more
cold winters because of climate change and they did actually mention the
UK climate protections which are part of the Climate Change Risk
Assessment as a justiﬁcation for this, but it was based on a mis-
interpretation because these things are supposed to be a longer term trend
towards milder winters over decades, it doesn’t mean that now we’re
expecting fewer cold winters now you see. We need to be careful to make
sure that people are aware of the diﬀerence between climate variability
and long-term climate change and I think we can do more on that in a
climate change risk assessment.” (AC2)
5. Conclusion
This paper has compared the 2012 and 2017 CCRAs to identify
potential areas of improvement for future UK adaptation policy. Using a
combination of research methods we found that the 2017 CCRA was
still underpinned by highly reductive science like modelling and risk-
based analyses, although there were also qualitative judgments made
by experts through the peer review process of the 2016 evidence report.
Arguably, the use of previous modelling (UKCIP09) was largely a cost-
saving issue due to the substantially diminished budget for the 2017
CCRA in comparison to the 2012 CCRA. However, being heavily
quantitative data-led, the second CCRA process has enabled policy-
makers to take a more top-down approach to adaptation policymaking
than the 2012 CCRA, which had been criticised for being too partici-
patory-focused, convoluting central government’s ability to make evi-
dence-based policy decisions based on urgency (Brown et al., 2018). In
this sense, the 2017 CCRA represented value for money from a gov-
ernment’s point of view, although some of our interviewees were still
sceptical of its true value to their own organization.
Financial constraints remain a key issue for the UK government
being able to deliver the most robust suite of adaptation actions pos-
sible. Devolution coupled with budget cuts means that Local Authorities
are in no position to address the risks identiﬁed in the 2017 UK CCRA,
as there is no capacity - people or funds - to address local adaptation
needs (Kythreotis and Bristow, 2017; Porter et al., 2015), and devolu-
tion has resulted in slightly diﬀerent approaches to assessing climate
risks and implementing policy actions. This is where methods of co-
production can be used to fuller eﬀect, enabling the government to save
more money locally by bringing in a greater array of governance actors
more attuned to local conditions who can make decisions, or at least
have greater legitimacy in gathering an evidence-base of what works,
and more importantly, what does not, at the local level (Howarth et al.,
2017). This would also make communication pathways less opaque
between government and non-government end-users of the CCRA.
Other interviewees highlighted that their use of the CCRA was
limited as it was not relevant to their business function and they were
operating at diﬀerent timescales. The majority of interviewees however
used the CCRA to make a business case for adaptation, to shape di-
rection of policy or work and for practical application. With this in
mind, a range of recommendations were made by the interviewees,
based on their own assessment of the use and usefulness of the CCRAs
and the comparison between the 2012 and 2017 reports.
1 Building on the range of methodological approaches adopted for the
reports, further improvements were suggested to enable a more
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granular application, a better incorporation of wide ranging evi-
dence and providing space for the incorporation of more innovative
techniques and methods for modelling data. This would lead to a
better assessment of the number and type of infrastructure and
properties at risk from climate impacts and incorporating more
stakeholder input at very early stages of assessment development.
2 Mechanisms for operationalisation of the CCRA are needed to build
on existing interlinkages between risks and sectors to improve de-
cision-making. This would provide a wider range of scales of focus
of operationalisation (e.g. local, city) to help guide decision-making
to better ﬁt with end user needs leading to better clarity and
alignment of responsibilities for response.
3 Better communication of the CCRAs and key risks and re-
commendations are required to demonstrate how the reports can be
most useful to speciﬁc audiences (which should be deﬁned). This
would help address language barrier issues which currently serve to
alienate users of the CCRAs and can confuse decision makers rather
than to inform and make the reports more accessible to non-expert
audiences.. The use of expert jargon has certainly ostracised parti-
cular stakeholders from the adaptation policy process, reinforcing
this notion of pragmatic state-authoritarianism that forecloses pro-
cesses of co-production and polycentric governance in climate
adaptation policy implementation in the UK.
In reﬂecting on our overall ﬁndings, we suggest that relevant UK
government policymakers adopt a new framework to help navigate
some of the process issues that we have identiﬁed in this paper re-
garding UK CCRAs and subsequent adaptation policy. Whilst deﬁning
such a framework is beyond the scope of this paper, the main issue
ascertained from our interviews revolves around the need for a more
heuristic examination of the epistemic complexity that has tinged cli-
mate science-policy processes over the last decade. A new framework
will need to be underpinned by a more transparent information gath-
ering approach that gives more credence to reﬂexive, context- and
place-speciﬁc co-produced knowledge(s) above and beyond determi-
nistic science-policy framings. Such a framework needs to be under-
pinned by robust institutions operating across jurisdictional policy
scales in the UK that can absorb diﬀerent kinds of climate knowledge
more easily. This will enable government and non-government sectors
alike to more fully address the inherent temporal, scalar and socio-
political uncertainties brought about by short- and long-term climate
impacts.
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